This course aims to provide a broad overview of the central problems of epistemology
We will begin (Item 1) introducing the basic concepts and traditional problems of epistemology. The emphasis will be made on its relations with other disciplines, both philosophical and non-philosophical. From this basis, we will address in more detail three major areas: skepticism and relativism (Item 2), the naturalization of epistemology (Item 3), and the connection between belief, content, and normativity (Item 4). Finally, we will get into some of the most passionate discussions of current epistemology.
1. Introduction
2. Skepticism and relativism
3. The naturalization of epistemology
4. Belief, content and normativity
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BS6. To have a strong knowledge base that allows them to innovate in the development and/or implementation of ideas, especially for research purposes.
BS7. The ability to apply the knowledge they have acquired and their ability to solve problems in new or little known areas within wider (or multidisciplinary) contexts related to their field of study.
BS8. The ability to integrate knowledge and deal with the complexities of forming opinions based on incomplete or limited information, including reflections on social responsibilities and ethics.
BS9. The ability to clearly and unambiguously communicate conclusions and the knowledge and reasons behind them to specialized and non-specialized audiences.
BS10. Learning skills to carry out further studies and research in a self-directed and autonomous way.
GS1. Students should be able to produce readable, detailed and technically correct documents and research work that meets the current international standards for the disciplines.
SS1. The ability to identify traditional and current knowledge specific to the field of logic and philosophy of science, as well as the different trends of thought and tradition involved.
SS2. Mastery of the analytical tools provided by philosophy to facilitate the clear identification of the semantic, logical, epistemological, ontological, axiological and ethical factors that are present in science and technology.
SS3. The ability to assess disputes, considering and overviewing alternatives to decide upon the better justified and reasoned parts.
SS4. To be able to identify arguments as they appear in texts, dialogues and discussions, assessing their accuracy, acceptability and persuasiveness.